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Notes
Jet Noise in Airpori Areas: A National
Solution Required*
I. INTRODUCTION
For at least fifteen years it has been urged that commercial
airport areas be carefully zoned to provide adequate noise buffers
between them and surrounding residential communities.' Al-
though many established residential areas2 already have severe
noise problems resulting from public airports, those responsible
for such land use planning continue to permit creation of resi-
dential areas within hearing range of jet noise sources.
As commercial air operations expand, and more powerful
and thunderous jets begin operations, the noise could become so
great that owners of such residences will incur substantial eco-
nomic losses.3 Residents within a few miles of public airports
may find that normal conversations, use of television, radio, and
telephones, and normal sleep will become difficult or impossible.
In some instances family members may even experience genuine
fear.4 Moreover, not only will the number of afflicted property
owners increase, but noise levels in presently affected areas will
also intensify.5
* The primary concern of this Note is the problem of jet trans-
port noise along flight paths near public airports. The problem of the
sonic boom is dealt with in the Appendix.
1. E.g., PREsIDENT'S AIRPORT CommIssIoN (Doolittle Report)
(1952); see Strunck, Airport Zoning and Its Future, 50 A.B.A.J. 345
(1964); Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, in ALLEVIATION or
JET AnrcsHAr NOISE PANEL 120 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PREsiDENs'S
PANEL].
2. PRESIDENT'S PANEL 7. For instance, in 1966, about 150 suits
concerning airport area noise were pending. One New York City suit
alone involved 807 property owners. Goldstein, A Problem in Federal-
ism, Property Rights in Air Space and Technology, in id. at 132.
3. See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962)
(homeowners lost from 40 to 55% of their property values); Martin V.
Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 312, 391 P.2d 540, 543 (1964); PREsi-
DENT'S PANEL 3-4, 120, 124. For the noise levels at which occupancy
becomes brutish or impossible see note 61 infra and accompanying text.
For prospects concerning increased airport noise through the 1980's, see
notes 61, 78 infra.
4. These are the usual interferences with enjoyment of property
upon which claims for a taking are based. E.g., Griggs v. County of
Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167
So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1964); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d
540 (1964).
5. PRESIDENT'S PANEL 3; Richards, The Control of Aircraft Noise
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Pressures presently exist for a national solution to the prob-
lem, and greater federal involvement may be imminent.6 There-
fore, this Note will examine the present and future scope of
airport noise problems, the present status of legal relief afforded
airport area residents, and the financial burdens involved.
Suggestions will be made concerning appropriate legal remedies
and equitable policies for distribution of the costs incurred be-
cause of airport noise.
II. RIGHTS OF A PROPERTY OWNER UNDER
PRESENT LAW
A. INVERSE CoImmvjATION: THE PRwcn'PAL REmvEDY
All courts agree that some residents aggrieved by substantial
noise from nearby public airports should have a legal remedy.7
They also agree, however, that the proper remedy is not an in-
junction preventing airport operations.8 The policy underlying
this reputedly universal view 9 is that however disturbing or dam-
aging noisy operations may be to some airport area residents,
the general social need for such operations is a paramount inter-
est.'0 Instead, the avenues to relief are limited to the tort the-
Perceived at Ground Level---Technical Aspects, 68 RoYAL AERONAUTICAL
Soc'Y 45, 46-47 (1964); Gibson, The Case Against the SST, Harpers,
July, 1966, p. 76.
6. Initiative for solving problems of jet aircraft noise can
effectively come only from a source not compromised by eco-
nomic interests in conflict with those of the major groups now
involved-engine and aircraft manufacturers, airline operators,
and local governments. And there is only one source meeting
this constraint which can be functionally effective-the Federal
Government.
PRESIDEN'S PANEL 4.
7. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Batten v.
United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962) (dictum); Thornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
8. Fleming, Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property With-
out Just Compensation, 18 S.C.L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1966); see Thornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 191, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (1962). But see
Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 190, 132 S.E.2d 188 (1963).
9. Tondel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 122.
10. In addition, national defense and economic interests in air
transport are substantial. See, e.g., FAA, 1965 NATIONAL AIPORT PLAN
7; Tondel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 117; Symposium on the United States
Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program, 30 J. AiR L. &
Com. 2 (1964); Burkhardt, Supersonic Aircraft-To Build or Not To
Build?, New Republic, Dec. 24, 1966, p. 12.
Thus the defense of legalized nuisance is clearly most justified when
the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the public airport operations. See Loma
Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal. 2d 708, 394 P.2d 548
(1964); Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.
[Vol. 51:10871088
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ories of trespass and nuisance or a constitutional theory of in-
verse condemnation. 1
Simple trespass is an unsatisfactory theory. If the property
owner sues in trespass on the basis of flights through the air-
space above his land, he is thwarted by the congressional doc-
trine that a landowner does not own the navigable airspace
above his property.12 Besides, since many afflicted property
owners who reside up to four thousand feet from either side of
takeoff or glide paths13 cannot allege any property rights in
these paths, no trespass is committed against them. 4
A simple nuisance theory is equally unsatisfactory. In most
jurisdictions, public airports are considered of sufficient value to
the general good to be regarded as legalized or privileged nui-
sances.'5 This status provides immunity not only from injunc-
tions, but also from some or all damage actions.' 6
1962). But see Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948)
(dictum).
11. Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 J. Am L. &
CoM. 341, 343, 348 (1960); see Tondel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 124-25.
12. 72 Stat. 740, 798 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1508(a) (1964). 72
Stat. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964) allows the FAA to issue
regulations determining what altitudes shall be navigable airspace. Thus
any alleged trespass can be said to be privileged and nonactionable if
made in accord with the regulations. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1967) sets min-
imum altitudes of 500-1000 feet except upon landings and takeoffs, for
which specified glide paths must be observed. See generally 2 NiCHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.514(2) (1963); PROSSER, TORTS § 13, at 70-72 (3d
ed. 1964); Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. AiR L.
& Com. 207, 215 (1964).
13. Kryter, Evaluation of Psychological Reactions of People to Air-
craft Noise, PRESIDENT's PANEL 25.
14. The trespass requirement is variously referred to in the cases
as a penetration to airspace, invasion, overflight, or physical penetration.
15. See Tondel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 125 and cases cited therein.
But cf. McQUILLAN, MmxuciPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.24b, .47, .96 (1963).
16. It has been held that damages for nuisance will not be awarded
against a public authority, unless a statute specifically allows them. The
courts fear that repeated actions of this nature could halt or thwart the
public activity. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 640 (1878);
see Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553-55 (1914)
and cases cited therein. Moreover, there appears to be a reluctance on
the part of some courts to award damages to plaintiffs who have suf-
fered less than the substantial interference needed for a taking, appar-
ently for fear of the economic burden upon the public. Anderson, Some
Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 J. AiR L. & CoM. 341, 358 (1960); Stoe-
buck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and
Prospect, 71 DicK. L. REV. 207, 233-35 (1967). Such fear may result in
part from the nature of nuisance damages, which allow recoveries for
injury to health, lost income, discomfort, extra expenses, and diminution
in property value. PROSSER, ToRTs § 691, at 623-24 (3d ed. 1964).
There is much criticism of the view that municipal corporations are
19671 1089
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An additional obstacle arises when recovery under a tort
theory is sought against the federal government since all such
actions must be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
17
Because there are substantial doubts as to whether such opera-
tions are within the discretionary duty exemptions of the act,'8
success of such actions is less sure than under inverse condem-
nation.19 Similar considerations also exist with respect to some
state tort claims acts.20
Over the past decade the most successful legal theory has
been inverse condemnation, under which it is asserted that air-
craft noise has resulted in the taking of a private property right
for a public use.21 An action in inverse condemnation differs
from an eminent domain proceeding only in that the private
property owner, rather than a governmental unit, institutes the
action. In both, the claim is that an activity under governmental
authority has taken or damaged some or all of the claimant's
property rights without paying him just compensation. 22
Inverse condemnation is based on the constitutional concept
of private property. This concept denotes a group of rights and
exempted from tort liability for governmental functions. As a result,
most states have exceptions to such imrunity. MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra
note 15, at § 53.29 (1963); PROSSER, ToRTs § 125, at 1009 (3d ed. 1964);
Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV.
437 (1941). It has been suggested that exceptions to municipal immu-
nity for publicly created nuisances were grounded on the constitutional
prohibition against a taking without compensation and that they became
widespread by courts anxious to minhnize municipal tort immunities.
PROSSER, op. cit. supra at 1009-10. See McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note
15, at § 53.30b; Antieu, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities,
40 Ky. L.J. 131, 131-32 (1952); Note, 46 HARV. L. REV. 305, 305-06 (1933).
However, the net effect has been that only twice in the past ten years
has a court approved a nuisance theory in suits against public airports.
Tondel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 125.
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680 (1964).
18. Where an agent or officer of the United States causes the tort
in the exercise of official discretion, such as the creation of a sonic
boom, governmental immunity is not waived. See Schwartz v. United
States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965); Huslander v. United States, 234 F.
Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964); WhiGuT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAnVS ACT
11-16 (1957). But see Brown v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D.
Mass. 1964) (dictum).
19. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 229.
20. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 466.01-.07 (1963); CAL. GOVT CODE §9
815.2, 820.2.
21. In the period 1956-1966, 25 out of 27 successful actions were
inverse condemnation actions. Tondel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 123-24.
E.g., City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1964); State
ex rel. Royal v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405
(1965).
22. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
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interests which inhere in the relationship between a person and a
thing, such as possession, use, and disposition.23  Governmental
interference with this relationship may range from complete de-
struction to substantial damage to all or a portion of the in-
dividual's property. It may have the general appearance of a
continuing trespass, as when a public authority floods land,24 or
it may appear as what would otherwise be a tortious impairment
of a land use covenant.2 5
In short, those acts which would give rise to various trespass
or nuisance claims when committed by private defendants may
give rise to actions for a taking of private property for public
use without compensation when they are committed under gov-
ernmental authority.26
Damages recoverable for airport noise under inverse condem-
nation are limited to loss in market value of the plaintiff's prop-
erty.27 Some cases suggest that recovery in one year would not
block additional recoveries in later years, if subsequently noisier
operations further diminish property value substantially. 28
Although most American courts agree that inverse condem-
nation is an appropriate theory upon which to proceed,29 they
are divided as to whether all residents who are substantially in-
jured should recover, or whether a method of limiting the num-
ber who may recover should be used. This division is illustrated
most vividly in the contrast between federal case law and that
currently developing in several states.
23. United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); An-
dress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 77, 85, 188 A.2d 709, 713 (1963).
24. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 113 F.2d 919 (8th
Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
25. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1141 (1965) and the authorities cited
therein, which are split as to the types of interferences with restrictive
covenants which require a public authority to make compensation.
26. See 2 NiCHOLS, op. cit. supra note 12, § 6.38, at 445.
27. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914);
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 309, 319, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (1964);
see City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1964). For
a discussion of the mechanics for choosing market values before and after
the airport expands (or newer, noisier jets are added), see Note, 47
MNN. L. REv. 889, 897-98 (1963). There is, however, little equitable
appeal in awarding compensation to one whose property values actually
rise because of the airport, but whose.windfall is smaller than others
because of increased noise. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County
in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962
Sup. CT. REv. 63, 89.
28. See City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla.
1964).
29. See note 21 supra.
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B. STATUS OF INVERSE CoNDEmmATON DocTRnE
1. Under Federal Law
Recovery has been allowed in the only two cases the United
States Supreme Court has decided involving loss of property
values due to aircraft noise. Both cases, United States v. Caus-
by 30 and Griggs v. County of Allegheny,31 stressed the penetra-
tion to airspace above plaintiffs' land and the substantial prop-
erty losses caused by the nuisance of aircraft noise and vibra-
tion. Consequently, the Court has been criticized for creating
ambiguity by using both trespass and nuisance language, without
clearly indicating whether either or both are indispensable to
recovery for a taking.32
This ambiguity probably arises from the Court's search for
a public use or purpose to which the plaintiff's property was
appropriated Griggs seemed to ho[d that two different proper-
ties were taken. First, a physical trespass by means of over-
flights constituted a taking of airspace above the land for public
use. Since this airspace was within the congressionally defined
public domain, 3 however, such a taking alone was not compen-
sable.34 Second, the Court found that the aircraft noise resulted
in a compensable taking of property value from the improved
surface land. The Court intermingled these two property ele-
ments so that the noncompensable public use of the airspace was
carried over to permit compensation for the loss in market value
of the surface land. An alternative approach would have been
to find that the improved surface land itself was subjected to a
public use by the absorption of byproducts, such as noise and
30. 328 U.S. 256 (1945) (noise from military overflights destroyed
chicken business).
31. 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (noise from commercial landings and take-
offs depreciated property values).
32. One state court which criticized this overflight requirement
maintained that the language of Causby and Griggs was not intended to
require actual penetration to the plaintiff's airspace as a prerequisite to
recovery for a taking. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 316-17,
391 P.2d 540, 545-46 (1964); see Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580,
585 (10th Cir. 1962) (dissent); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore.
178, 185-86, 376 P.2d 100, 103 (1962); Dmham, supra note 27, at 87; Note,
47 Mum. L. REv. 889, 894-95 (1963).
Many courts mix trespass and nuisance theories in determining
whether there has been a taking. Fleming, supra note 8, at 597-98.
33. See note 12 supra.
34. Although the Griggs' Court viewed airspace as the property
used, it rejected the argument that the airspace was taken by Congress,
declaring it to be part of the public domain. This legal effect probably
would have developed without congressional action. See PROSSER, TORTS
§ 13, at 72-73 (3d ed. 1964). There was no hint that Griggs sought
[Vol. 51:10871092
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shock waves.3 5 This alternative has not yet been accepted in
the airport cases.
The lower federal courts have recently followed an inverse
condemnation standard which does not allow recovery for a tak-
ing of property due to aircraft noise unless a number of aircraft
have physically penetrated the airspace above the land or unless
the nonoverflight noise took all or most of the property value.3 6
This standard is clearly traceable to the mixture of nuisance and
trespass language in Griggs. 37 One writer has argued that such a
construction should not be put upon Griggs or Causby because
"there is no justification in the [Supreme Court] precedents for
a requirement that the condemnor actually go upon or over or
under the objector's surface land."38s However, the leading case
of Batten v. United States39 justifies overflight as a prerequi-
site to recovery, primarily upon the basis of the trespass language
in Griggs and Causby, and a pair of Supreme Court cases deny-
ing recovery where there had been no physical invasion, and the
deprivation was either temporary or insubstantial.40
to use the overflight factor to limit the class of homeowner-plaintiffs.
Justice Black argued that if the airspace was the property taken for a
public use, Congress must have declared it free to all air travel, and it
would logically follow that the United States and not Allegheny County
was the taker. 869 U.S. 84, 90, 91 (1962) (dissent); see 72 Stat. 740
(1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964); Dunham, supra note 29, at 84-86. It has
been suggested that public use is an evaporating requirement. Note, 58
YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
35. Such a theory may be the Court's next step, according to Stoe-
buck, supra note 16, at 238.
36. In Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), ten
homeowners sued for taking-compensation because the noise of 4,000
monthly military flights (70% jet) plus scores of maintenance high
power rev-ups caused the market value of their homes to depreciate
40-55%. Id. at 583. The court stated that without an overflight to raise
the claim to the dignity of a constitutional taking, the plaintiffs must
be deprived of all or most of their property interests-such as rendering
the homes uninhabitable. Id. at 585. Batten cites Richards v. Washing-
ton Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914), where market value diminution
of about 27% was compensated as a taking without a trespass require-
ment. In accord with Batten, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Bellamy v. United States, 235
F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734
(E.D.S.C. 1964).
37 Those who disagree with Batten rely upon the nuisance empha-
sis in Griggs and Causby; those who agree rely strongly upon the tres-
pass language. See Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind. 692,
188 N.E.2d 406 (1963); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 316,
391 P.2d 540, 545, (1964); Dunham, supra note 27, at 87-88.
38. Dunham, supra note 27, at 87.
39. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), discussed in note 36 supra.
40. Both cases are distinguishable from Batten on several grounds:
19671 1093
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The policy underlying the physical trespass requirement
seems to have been to reduce the danger of a stifling liability
upon quasi-public activities, such as railroads, by discouraging
a host of suits for inconsequential interferences with private
property. Although there is no express evidence in Batten that
the court perceived a similar danger to air transportation, it can
be inferred that the court was determined to limit recoveries for
a taking to as small a number of plaintiffs as possible by insisting
upon penetration to airspace.41
The constitutional propriety of this insistence-the pivotal
issue of the overflight question- is subject to serious doubts.
For instance, in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,42 a prop-
erty owner suffered depreciation in the value of his residence due
to noise, vibrations, dust, and smoke from railroad operations.
That portion of the loss due to the railroad's general operations
which all persons in the general vicinity of the railroad had to
First, plaintiffs in both cases were on weak equitable grounds. In
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) the plaintiff suffered
only a temporary, partial obstruction to access to his property. In Bat-
ten and most of the airport noise cases, however, the interferences
appear to have been permanent. In United States v. Willow River Power
Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945), the plaintiff alleged that his use of adjacent
public river waters had diminished after a navigation improvement
affected the water level by three feet. The Court refused to classify the
plaintiff's use of adjacent public waters as a property right in the con-
stitutional sense. In Batten, the interference claimed by plaintiffs was
not to the use of adjacent public river waters, but to the use and enjoy-
ment of their privately owned residences.
Second, the strong language in Transportation Co. about the neces-
sity of a physical encroachment was later diminished to the point where
nuisances could not be legalized if they were of such serious character
as to rise to a taking. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546, 553 (1914) (dictum); Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church,
108 U.S. 317, 333-34 (1883) (dictum).
Third, whereas incidental damages will not lie without penetration,
use and enjoyment may not be greatly or entirely deprived, nor can
physical discomfort or annoyance be created without compensation if
the governmental body has alternatives open to it. Richards v. Wash-
ington Terminal Co., supra at 554-55; Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist
Church, supra at 332. Whether the 55% deprivations in Batten rise to
this standard is not clear under the precedents.
41. Batten seems to have assumed further that sound waves and
vibrations are not a penetration to surface property, although some
authorities have argued otherwise. Compare Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1914), with Batten v. United States,
306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962).
This has been termed the "unwarranted assumption commonly
found in the federal cases that sound and vibration waves cannot be
considered a 'physical invasion' . . . ." Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 309, 312 n.4, 391 P.2d 540, 543 n.4 (1964).
42. 233 U.S. 546, 555 (1914).
[Vol. 51:10871094
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suffer was held not compensable. The Court believed that lia-
bility for general losses could bring railroad operations to a stand-
still, even though it also admitted that such a policy would be a
hardship to the private landowner.43 However, the Court or-
dered compensation to be paid for that portion of the property
loss which was special to the plaintiff because of the location,
design, and manner of operation of the railroad facilities near
his property. Moreover, in addition to Richards, cases such as
Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church44 and United States
v. General Motors45 have been cited to show a clear trend by
the Supreme Court toward a nonphysical concept of property
taking, and away from the trespass requirement.
46
If Batten was correct in finding a physical invasion to be a
constitutional prerequisite to a taking, Richards would appear at
a minimum to create an exception under which no physical in-
vasion of property is needed if the property damages are special.
The rationale behind this proposition as applied to airports is
that, in effect, the governmental authority selects the plaintiff's
property and aims the damage at it, as opposed to creating the
general damages suffered by all who live in the airport vicinity.
47
2. Under State Law
Some state courts have followed the Batten reasoning that
there can be no taking without an overflight.48  Others have
held there is no logic in allowing recovery for a taking to one
individual whose property was overflown, while denying recov-
ery to his neighbor, a wingtip's distance away, when both suffer
43. Ibid. The Court stated that economic necessity outweighed the
hardship to the private landowner.
44. 108 U.S. 317 (1883). The Court held that although the rail-
road activities creating noise, vibrations, and soot were authorized by
Congress and would ordinarily be shielded from nuisance suits, the rail-
road had unnecessarily picked a site for its activities which injured the
plaintiff's property. Since other sites were available, recovery was
allowed in nuisance for property value losses plus discomforts. Id. at
535.
45. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
46. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 215-17, 224.
47. Such a standard raises the question whether government li-
censing of jets with sound intensities so high as to invariably reach all
residences within a given noise pattern along governmentally prescribed
takeoff and landing paths equals an infliction of special damages upon
those residences. See note 135 infra and accompanying text.
48. City of Atlanta v. Donald, 221 Ga. 135, 143 S.E.2d 737 (1965);
Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Bd. v. Long, 364 S.W.2d 167 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1962); State ex rel. Royal v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d
154, 209 N.E.2d 405 (1965).
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equal property value diminutions due to aircraft noise.4 9  Be-
cause twenty-five states have constitutional clauses which pro-
hibit taking, destroying, or damaging private property for public
use without compensation,5" these positions may not be con-
flicting. Thus some jurists believe that a prohibition upon dam-
aging private property would allow recovery for inverse con-
demnation without a penetration, whereas a prohibition only
upon taking would require a physical entry.51 However, at least
one interpretation of a constitution containing both provisions
has rejected this view. The Supreme Court of Washington al-
lowed recovery without an overflight solely on the basis of the
taking provision, finding the damaging provision unnecessary to
the result.5 2 Moreover, although lacking a damaging clause in
its constitution, the Oregon Supreme Court has permitted re-
coveries for inverse condemnation in the absence of overflights, 3
and decisions in several other states, dealing with analogous prob-
lems, indicate that those jurisdictions would reach the same
result.5 4
The best explanation of the judicial dichotomy regarding
the overflight requirement can be obtained by examining the
49. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 316, 391 P.2d 540,
545 (1964); see City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla.
1964); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 198, 376 P.2d 100, 109
(1962); Dunham, supra note 27, at 87.
50. 2 NicHoLs, ENINENT DoMAIN § 6.1(3) (1963); see, e.g., McKee
v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 284, 199 N.E.2d 592, 593 (1964);
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
51. State ex rel. Royal v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 157,
209 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1965); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309,
316-18, 391 P.2d 540, 545-46 (1964); Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., 233 U.S. 546, 554 (1914) (dictum).
52. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 316-17, 391 P.2d 540,
545-46 (1964).
53. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100(1962); see Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in
Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 207, 224 (1967). Florida also
has allowed such recovery. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.
2d 95 (Fla. 1964).
54. At least six states have decided cases on the basis of inverse
condemnation by nuisance-odors, noise-without trespass. Stoebuck,
supra note 53, at 224-27 and authorities cited therein. In addition, New
Jersey has held that no trespass requirement is necessary for a com-
pensable taking of property value by highway traffic noise. Board of
Educ. v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (1965). In Enos Coal
Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind. 692, 188 N.E.2d 406 (1963), Griggs was
construed as requiring no trespass, and recovery was allowed for vibra-
tions alone. Id. at 695-96, 188 N.E.2d at 407-08. Iowa law seems to be
that any highway changes which interfere with access, light, air, or view
are compensable takings without physical appropriation. 2 NicHOLS, op.
cit. supra note 50, at § 6.4441(3) and cases cited therein.
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underlying policy.55 Implicit in the Batten decision, and express
in the older railroad cases which discussed the trespass re-
quirement, was the policy of limiting liability for public activi-
ties, despite acknowledged hardship to injured parties. Such a
limitation could flow rationally only from a fear that permitting
wider recoveries would create serious adverse effects upon the
national economic interest by unduly burdening public activi-
ties.';
The issue thus becomes whether the economic costs created
by jet transport noise should be borne in general by afflicted
home owners, or whether they should be imposed upon some
larger group, such as airport authorities, state governments, or
the federal government. 57 Those who strongly believe that im-
posing the burden upon a larger body would be economically
undesirable in terms of potentially adverse effects upon air
transportation would be likely to choose an overflight require-
ment. Others, who assign larger values to the protection of
private property rights,58 or who believe that the costs of public
air transportation should reside primarily with those who most
enjoy its benefits, will tend to reject the overflight rationale.
To answer such a policy question, it is necessary to consider
the cost burdens involved. Since no decision attempting to
undertake such an inquiry has been found, it appears that courts
have taken the relative significance of cost burdens to be axio-
matic. To evaluate these covertly held positions, the total scope
of the costs involved must be understood. Therefore, an inquiry
into the present status of aircraft and airport noise, its effects
upon man, its future potential, and its physical remedies must
be undertaken.
III. A DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS OF AIRPORT NOISE
A. IImuM RESPONSE TO NoISE
Aircraft noise decisions have not been guided by scientific
studies of either individual tolerances or community outrage.
55. The denial of reparations should be based on reasons of policy
which are strong enough to counterbalance the constitutional demand
that reparations be paid. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178,
192, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (1962); see Richards, The Control of Aircraft
Noise Perceived at Ground Level--Technical Aspects, 68 RoYAL AERO-
NAUTICAL Soc'y 45, 47 (1964).
56. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 555
(1914); Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 331-32
(1883); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 640 (1878).
57. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 89.
58. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 102 (Fla. 1964).
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Courts have relied instead upon evidence of interference with
sleep, thinking, conversations, radio and television, telephone use,
and creation of fear. Although evidence has generally been
limited to witnesses and an occasional report of indoor decibel
levels59 during aircraft operations,60 research studies of the ef-
fects of jet noise reveal features which have important legal
significance.6'
59. A decibel is a physical measure of the faintest audible sound
and the smallest degree of difference in loudness detectable by human
hearing. WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 585 (3d ed. 1965).
Technically it is a measure of sound pressure variations in normal at-
mospheric pressure of .0002 microbars (microbar = pressure of about
y normal atmospheric pressure). PETERSON & GRoss, HANDBOOK1,000.000
OF NoisE MEASUREMENT 3 (1960); see MEE, SouND 134 (1950).
Aircraft noise is frequently reported in "perceived noise decibels"
(PNdb.) which is an internationally adopted standard measure of the
subjective loudness of the noise. New York, London, Moscow, and other
cities have established airport noise maximums of 100 to 112 PNdb., but
many feel that 100 PNdb. is the maximum noise tolerable because above
that level, hostility to noise rises rapidly. See PRESIDENT'S PANEL 4-5
(1966); Beranek, Kryter & Miller, Reaction of People to Exterior Air-
craft Noise, Noise Control, Sept. 1959, p. 25; Mel'nikov, Noise Generated
on the Ground During Takeoff and Landing of the Tu-124 Passenger
Aircraft, 11 SoVrET Pxvsics-AcousTics 1.70 (1965); Richards, supra note
55, at 45.
60. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (unable
to sleep, phone, converse); State ex rel. Royal v. City of Columbus, 3
Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405 (1965) (cracked plaster, disrupted sleep,
and inaudible TV); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d
540 (1964) (unable to sleep, converse, hear TV and radio, fear created);
see McPike, Recommended Practices fcr Use in the Measurement and
Evaluation of Aircraft Neighborhood Noise Levels, Soc'Y or AuToMoTIVE
ENGINEERS PAPER 650216, at 7 (April 12-15, 1965) [hereinafter cited as
SAE PAPER].
61. The following is a reference basis for evaluating individual
responses to noise:
Psychological Response db. PNdb.
Quiet 66 82
Noisy 93 108
Intrusive 96 115
Robinson, Bowsher & Copeland, On Judging the Noise from Aircraft in
Flight, 13 AcusTicA 324, 332 (1963). It has been found that continuous
neighborhood exposure to levels above 85 db. leads to vigorous com-
munity protest and action. PETERSON & GRoss, op. cit. supra note 59, at
74-75. Above 105 PNdb., community hostility to aircraft noise rises
rapidly as the number of occurences increases. Kryter, Evaluation of
Psychological Reactions to Aircraft Noise, in PRssmEN's PANEL 13, 19,
22; PRESIDENT'S PANEL 5. It is frequently noted that the advent of the
SST and other super jets will involve'a large increase in exposure to
noise above the 100 PNdb. range. See Ingerslev, Measurement and
Description of Aircraft Noise in the Vicinity of Airports, 3 J. SouND
AN VIBmTIoN 95 (1966); Symposium--SST Development Program, 30
J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 14 (1964); Tanner & McLeod, Preliminary Measure-
ments of Take-Off and Landing Noise From a New Instrument Range,
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Recent NASA tests have demonstrated that a person three
miles from the takeoff point and one thousand feet to the side
of the flight path of a tested supersonic transport 62 (a military
SST) would perceive a noise louder than Niagara Falls-
nearly the equivalent of firing a machine gun at close range.6 3
Even when shouting, audibly perfect conversations with persons
standing six inches away would be impossible.6 4 The noise would
be much greater than the level at which abstract thinking be-
comes impossible for many humans.65 It would be above the
level at which the United States Air Force requires its personnel
to wear earplugs.6  Under normal atmospheric conditions it is
not likely that sound perceived one thousand feet to the side of
the flight path would reach the range of tolerability 67 until a
climbing plane had traveled at least five miles from the start of
takeoff.6 8  Moreover, it can be determined quite precisely
in NASA SPEcIAL REPORTS 33, at 86, 90 (May 10-12, 1965) [hereinafter
cited as NASA SP].
62. This was an average of 15 db. louder than the current fanjet
transport with which it was compared. Tanner & McLeod, supra note
61, at 86, 90; see Robinson, Bowsher & Copeland, On Judging Noisefrom Aircraft in Flight, 13 ACUSTICA 327, 332 (1963).
63. Breathing - 10 db.
Breeze 20
Busy Traffic 70
Machine Gun, close range 130
Jet at takeoff _140
Space Rocket __ 175
Time, Aug. 19, 1966, p. 24; see PETERSON & GROSS, op. cit. supra note 59,
at 71-72.
64. The courts frequently mention interferences with conversations
and telephoning as elements of serious interference with property use.
Telephone use interference is as follows:
Less than 60 db. interference satisfactory
60-70 db. difficult
above 75 db. -impossible
In addition, audibly perfect conversations could not take place between
persons six feet apart until the interfering noise was reduced to 49 db.
PETERSON & GROSS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 14, 71.
65. 2 BOLT, BERANEK & NEWMAN, AcousTic NOISE CONTROL 148
(1952).
66. Fleming, Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property With-
out Just Compensation, 18 S.C.L. REV. 593, 599 (1966).
67. Above 105 PNdb. community hostility to airport noise rises
rapidly. PresiDENT's PANEL 5.
68. The 100 PNdb. level extends about 30,000 feet beyond the start
of takeoff. Galloway, Measurement and Description of Aircraft Noise
Exposure Around an Airport, in PREsmENT's PAL 28, 34. It has been
argued that it would be unreasonable to expect a local airport to acquire
land within the 100 PNdb. blanket since this would require purchasing
a belt of residential property 7Y to 10 miles long and a few thousand
feet wide.
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where the offensive noise contours will exist at a given airport.""
Present jetliners create sufficient noise upon takeoff and
landing to cause wide community agitation and lawsuits by those
residing near airports.7 0 The attitude of the community toward
the air transport industry has been said to control its tolerance
of increased jet noise.7 1 However, because of human physio-
logical characteristics, there is a relatively minimal level at which
noise causes speech interference, pain, and hearing loss, and is
said to "attack the biological organism. '72 Therefore, it would
seem fair to infer that favorable community attitudes can have
only marginal effects upon establishing maximum noise levels
for reasonable aircraft operation in airport vicinities.7 3
Furthermore, it has been clearly established that as the fre-
quency of aircraft takeoffs and landings increases, the average
amount of noise tolerated from each aircraft substantially de-
creases.7 4 This psychological factor greatly complicates the prob-
lem of airport area noise as the magnitude of jet transport
operations increases.
B. JET AIRCRAFT NOISE PoTENTIALs
Given a society with such vulnerabilities to noise, the im-
portant considerations become the noise levels which will be
created during the next generation of jet aircraft, and the portion
of the population which will be exposed to them. Jets cur-
rently in commercial service project substantial blasts of noise
along their takeoff and landing paths for several miles beyond
69. Marsh & McPike, Noise Levels of Turbojet-and Turbofan-
Powered Aircraft, Sound, Sept.-Oct., 1963, pp. 8, 11-13; McPike, supra
note 60, at 8-10.
70. See PREsimEN's PANEL 3. For example, the margin between
community complaint and outrage is 90-105 FNdb. Id. at 5. For the
possibility of psychoses through sleep interruptions, see N.Y. Times,
March 13, 1966, p. 66, col. 4; cf. 2 BOLT, BERANEK, & NEWMAN, op. cit.
supra note 65, at 148.
71. Time, Aug. 19, 1966, p. 24; see N.Y. Times, July 9, 1966, p. 24,
col. 3.
72. 2 BOLT, BERANEK & NEWmAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 148;
PEERSON & GRoss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 9, 75.
73. If hearing loss and speech and telephone interference have
readily measurable limits, and community psychological response is
quite constant, favorable community attitude is a slim reed to rely upon
in planning future airports and their operations. See notes 62-65 supra.
74. With one occurence per day, community noise tolerance will
allow up to 115 PNdb. before vigorous individual complaints and poten-
tial concerted community action appear. With 64 flights per day this
drops to 97 PNdb., and with 128 flights per day the tolerability level
falls to 94 PNdb. Kryter, op. cit. supra note 61, at 22.
1100 [Vol. 51:1087
JET NOISE
airports.7 5 These areas can be determined well in advance of
actual commercial flights, based on the findings that the noise
pattern created on takeoff is conic in shape, with the peak at
the point downrange at which the jet finally attains sufficient
altitude to substantially dissipate the noise before it reaches
the ground.7 6 [See fig. 1] To minimize this lengthy pattern
of noise exposure, some airports now require jet craft to make a
sharp, climbing turn during takeoff and/or a sharp cutback in
thrust during the climb.77 Such procedures may not be possible
with the future super jets because they will require generation
of far greater thrusts.78
Landing, rather than takeoff, presents the major noise prob-
lem for many airports, especially those without over-water land-
ing paths. Because landing approaches are generally less steep
than climbouts, greater area in the vicinity of a landing path is
exposed to low altitude jet noise for a longer period of time
than on takeoffs. In addition, if special maneuvers cannot be
used, the greater noise produced by future turbojets and turbo-
fans will aggravate these problems.7 9
Although no significant technological breakthroughs in con-
trolling the source of jet engine noise are foreseen,8 0 a vast ex-
pansion of commercial air transport into supersonic (SST),
hypersonic (HST), and suborbital cargo rockets is probable.8 '
75. Hubbard, Cawthorn & Copeland, Factors Relating to the Air-
port-Community Noise Problem, in NASA SP 83, at 73, 76-77, 81 (May
10-12, 1965).
76. McPike, supra note 60, at 8, fig. 9.
77. Ruby, Operational Procedures, in PnmmsiNT's PANEL 102-03.
78. Id. at 104. Such operating procedures as preferred runaways,
turns from heavily populated communities, and high descents will not
adequately solve the noise problem. Environmental compatibility is the
only effective solution. Bakke, Air Traffic Control and Flight Proce-
dures, in PRESmENT'S PANEL 86, 88. In addition, offloading cargo in
order to reduce thrust is uneconomical. Tyler, A New Look at the Air-
craft Noise Problem, SAE PAPER 911B, at 3 (Oct. 5-9, 1964).
79. See Ingerslev, supra note 61, at 95.
80. PRESmENT'S PANEL 6; Symposium, supra note 61, at 44. Hush
kits can be used to muffle conventional jet noise somewhat, but these
reduce thrust during takeoff, which necessitates costly offloading and
a longer period of climb, thus exposing greater numbers of people on
the ground to the noise. Steeper takeoff and landing paths are often
recommended to minimize the period of low altitude flight over a com-
munity. This necessitates acquisition of more land in the airport vicin-
ity because takeoff thrusts will need to be greater and noisier. See
Tyler, supra note 79, at 9, 13.
81. U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 30, 1967, p. 64; See Martin v.
Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 317, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (1964); PREsi-
DENT'S PANEL 3; Ziegenfelder & Wilkinson, Jr., Super Airport Planning,
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The engines on these aircraft can be expected to create substan-
tially greater airport vicinity noise problems. Moreover, as the
number of takeoffs and landings triples in the next decade, and
a thousand planes are added to current air traffic each month,
82
community tolerance of aircraft noise will undoubtedly decline.8 3
Such expansions of air commerce, however, are compelled by na-
tional and international economic considerations of large magni-
tude.
84
C. COSTS: SCOPE AND DISTIBUTIoN
A recent test has revealed that an SST creates a noise carpet
one thousand feet wide for a distance of three miles beyond the
start of takeoff, which is thirty per cent greater than that
deemed acceptable. The point along the flightpath at which
the sound carpet diminishes to tolerable levels was not re-
ported.s1 If such a craft were flown from La Guardia Airport,
assuming no compatible land use areas to have been created
along the takeoff path, some residents of Jackson Heights, one
and one-half miles beyond the end of the runway, would be ex-
posed to sound levels well beyond the element of interference
with conversation, sleep, telephoning, and other factors which
have been material to recovery for inverse condemnation. 6 If
recovery were allowed to all these residents whose property
values substantially decreased as a result of such SST operations,
SAE PAPER 660282, at 2 (April 25-28, 1966); Business Week, Aug. 6,
1966, p. 142; Gibson, The Case Aginst the SST, Harpers, July, 1966, pp.
76, 82; Time, Jan. 13, 1967, p. 60. Ingerslev, supra note 61, at 95.
82. See FAA, 1966-1970 NATIONAL AImPORT PLA; Time, March 31,
1967, p. 52.
83. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
84. The decision to develop an American SST rested upon threats
to the earnings of domestic air carriers posed by the competing British-
French Concorde and the Russian SST. Exclusion of American manu-
facturers from the SST market could cause a balance of payments def-
icit from 12 to 30 billion dollars; American aviation leadership could
decline at least into the 1980's; and American aircraft builders would
become greatly dependent upon military orders to maintain their pro-
duction and profit levels. The SST program could create up to 100,000
new jobs and between 20 to 38.6 billion dollars in balance of payments
assets could be generated. Symposium, supra note 61, at 37; Burkhart,
SST-To Build or Not to Build?, New Republic, Dec. 24, 1966, p. 12, 13;
Business Week, Dec. 24, 1966, pp. 35, 36-67. But see Gibson, supra note
81, at 82-84. Passenger miles, cargo operations, and total air traffic can
be expected to increase strikingly by 1980. Symposium, supra note 61, at
30; Ziegenfelder & Wilkinson, Jr., supra note 81, at 3.
85. Tanner & McLeod, supra note 61, at 83-90.
86. Ibid.; see N.Y. Times, June 5, 1966, p. 113, col. 1; text accom-
panying notes 64-67 supra.
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the immediate costs to the defendant could prove very substan-
tial.87
In determining how to distribute such immediate costs, those
parties who clearly should not bear them should be eliminated
from consideration. The private homeowner who loses up to
fifty-five per cent of his property value is least able to bear the
cost.8 In contrast to some foreign decisions,8 9 the American
courts have not imposed the burden of damages upon the com-
merical airlines whose aircraft produce the noise.9 0 This ap-
proach is clearly justified, since the airlines are not at liberty to
select airport sites, approaches, or flight paths: Commercial
aircraft are certified and controlled in their landing and takeoff
maneuvers by the Federal Aviation Agency.9 1 It has also been
suggested that where several commercial airlines use the same
public airport, plaintiffs would be under an extreme handicap
in attempting to identify the exact sources of the noise which
constitute the taking.92
Aside from cases involving military air fields, the defendant
is almost universally the public airport authority.9 3 Arguably,
however, Griggs has not closed the door to making the United
States a defendant in suits for inverse condemnation. 4 Given the
fact that substantial national benefits are derived from the exist-
87. Odell, Jet Noise at John F. Kennedy International Airport, in
PRESIDENT'S PANEL 162, 166.
88. The plaintiffs lost 40.8% to 55.3%-$4,700 to $8,800-in prop-
erty value in Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962).
89. For the methods of handling the airport noise problem else-
where, see Caplan, The Control of Aircraft Noise Perceived at Ground
Level--Legal Aspects, 68 RoYAL AERONAUTICAL Soc'y 49, 50 (1964)
(England); Mel'nikev, Noise Generated on the Ground During Take-
off and Landing of the Tu-124 Passenger Aircraft, 11 SOWET PHYSICS-
AcousTics 170 (1965) (U.S.S.R.); Time, March 18, 1966, p. 67 (France).
90. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Note,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1585-88 (1961).
91. "Planes do not wander about in the sky .... They move only
by federal permission" which is "intensive and exclusive." Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 332 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (concurring opinion).
See note 12 supra.
92. Fleming, supra note 66, at 601.
93. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). In dis-
sent, Justices Black and Frankfurter argued that since Congress had
financed and induced local governments to create airports in pursuit of
a national and international air system, to so emburden local units could
frustrate this congressional purpose and place an unfair proportion of
costs upon local agencies. Id. at 94.
94. Griggs has been read to hold that the local airport authority is
a proper party defendant, but that there may also be others. Dunham,
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 86.
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ence and growth of national and international air commerce,95 as-
sumption by the federal government of the costs of noise dam-
age to private property does not seem inequitable. Moreover, a
broad federal tax basis would permit the federal government to
spread these costs nationally. Even if the local airport authority
is the sole defendant as in Griggs, however, it will have to inter-
nalize the inverse condemnation costs and either attempt to shift
them to the airlines and hence to airline customers or seek to
offset part of them through solicitation of increased federal and
state subsidies 0 Therefore, if costs should be proportionate to
the control possessed and benefits derived, the federal govern-
ment should be a defendant.
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES
A. ZONING
The main thrust against the argument for federal financing
of the costs of increased airport noise is based upon supposed
local responsibility for zoning. It is contended that a govern-
mental unit cannot properly be held accountable for such prop-
erty losses unless it had zoning control when residential en-
croachments upon the immediate airport vicinity came into be-
ing.97 And since Congress has traditionally adhered to a policy
of leaving development of local airports to local governmental
units,98 some writers have concluded that the federal government
should be exempt from economic responsibility for the noise
problem.9 9
This argument, however, is questionable upon a number of
grounds. Congress has long provided financing, standards, and
research for air transportation. 0 0 In fact, the air transport sys-
95. See note 84 supra; S. REP. No. 446, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1963); cf. Richards, supra note 55, at 45, 47-49.
96. Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. Am L.
& CoM. 207, 215-16 (1964). Since the states generally grant zoning
power to local units, they have retained little control of local zoning
situations. See ANDERSON & RoSWIG, PLANNING, ZONING, AND SUBDIVISION
178-79 (1966).
97. See Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, in PRESIDENT'S
PANEL 117, 119-120; Dygert, supra note 96, at 216.
98. PRESIDENT'S PANEL 7; see 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1277-
79 (1964).
99. Dygert, supra note 96, at 215-16; see Tondel, op. cit. supra note
97, at 119-21.
100. See, e.g., 72 Stat. 752 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1353, 1354; 69 Stat.
441 (1955), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-11 (1964); 60 Stat. 170 (1946), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1964).
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tem is historically a creature of the federal government. 10 ' The
commercial and defense benefits of the airport system are not
limited to airport communities themselves, but are directly or
indirectly realized by the nation as a whole.10 2 Furthermore,
burdening local governmental units with such immediate costs
is expected to curtail severely local funds available for tradi-
tionally local items such as schools, hospitals, and roads. 0 3 Such
a curtailment could serve to enlarge the federal role in financing
such local facilities. 0 4 If this should result, the actual financing
of airport noise costs would ultimately, though indirectly, be
borne by the federal government.
It is highly questionable whether local authorities are cap-
able of providing adequate land use planning in airport areas.
As zoning plans are being shaped, it is necessary to develop noise
contour studies of engines' 0 5 during their research and develop-
ment stages, in order to intelligently anticipate zoning needs.
Local zoning authorities have neither the facilities nor the power
to measure and control the noise sources being developed. The
financing of much of the research and the eventual certification
of new aircraft and engines is under the aegis of the FAA.10
Moreover, since the flight paths of the noise sources are con-
trolled by the FAA, local zoning plans are adequate only insofar
as they are able to respond to flight path changes over which
local government has no control.
In addition, local airport authorities often have extraterri-
torial zoning powers only within severely circumscribed limits.
For instance, some states grant such power only within one-
quarter to two miles of airport boundaries. 10 7 Another compli-
cation tending to neutralize the power of local authorities to
zone airport areas effectively is the division of zoning power in
101. Dygert, A Public Enterprise Approach to Jet Aircraft Noise
Around Airports, in PRESMENT'S PANEL 3.07, 111.
102. See text accompanying notes 84 supra and 115 infra; Burkhart,
SST-To Build or Not To Build?, New Republic, Dec. 24, 1966, p. 12.
103. Goldstein, A Problem in Federalism, Property Rights in Air
Space and Technology, in PRESIDENT'S PANEL 132, 142.
104. Perhaps the same demand which caused federal funds to be-
come available for impacted defense areas would impel federal funds
for areas with large inverse condemnation costs.
105. McPike, Recommended Practices for Use in the Measurement
and Evaluation of Aircraft Neighborhood Noise Levels, SAE PAPER
650216, at 7-9 (April 12-15, 1965).
106. See PRESIDENT'S PANEL 3, 147.
107. Note, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 99, 105-07; WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING
AND MumcnPAL PuBLIc POLIcY 388 (1958).
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such areas among several local governmental units. 08
It may be further suggested that wherever airports are
located, access freeways soon follow; and wherever freeways go,
housing developers follow. Since housing developers often
carry considerable weight with local zoning authorities, local
units are sometimes inherently incapable of prescribing adequate
zoning for airport areas. 09
One possible solution to local inability to zone airport areas
effectively would be to require the FAA to include compatible
land use zoning as a mandatory criterion for grants to local air-
port authorities." 0 Should such a proposal be effectuated, the
federal government will clearly bear a major, though indirect,
responsibility for zoning of future airport areas."' Although
some believe the federal government lacks the constitutional
108. The Port of New York Authority was unable to prevent thou-
sands of homes from being built within the shadow of JFK International
Airport recently. At Dulles International Airport, zoning authority re-
sides in two counties which have refused FAA requests to compatibly
zone the area. This is a "prime example of the problem of divided
jurisdictions" which supports the need to place adequate zoning control
in the hands of local airport authorities. Odell, op. cit. supra note 87, at
166; PREsiDENT's PANEL 7. Adequate federal noise guidelines for airports
which are not yet afflicted are necessary today in order to assure large
savings in the future. See Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 103, at 141.
109. Tyler, supra note 79, at 1; see PRESIDENT'S PANEL 3-4; Tondel,
op. cit. supra note 97, at 120.
110. The same suggestion has been made concerning certification of
new aircraft. Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 103, at 132. Under 14 C.F.R.
§§ 151.9-.11 (1967), federal funds or grants for airport construction or
repairs are presently given only if the airport sponsor acquires or
promises to acquire "runway clear zones." As defined in 14 C.F.R. §
77.27(b)-(c) (1967) these zones include no noise requirement but per-
tain only to flight safety. In March 1966, the FAA proposed to amend
its regulations to require applicants for federal funds to show that their
land acquisitions would meet requirements of the National Airport Plan
for the next five years, but here again noise factors were not included.
31 Fed. Reg. 4523 (1966). Because funds available for distribution to
public airports were less than requests submitted, priorities were estab-
lished for fiscal 1967. Again noise requirements were not included. 31
Fed. Reg. 7766 (1966). Such funds are distributed under 49 U.S.C. §§
1101 (3) (B), 1103 (1964), and these seem to permit acquisitions for pur-
poses of flight safety only. Thus, noise costs currently reside outside the
concern of the federal government.
111. See 72 Stat. 749 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1964); 78 Stat. 161
(1964); 14 C.F.R. § 91.87(g) (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1002, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1963); Fox, Consideration of the Problems Arising From the
Effects of Jet Engine Sounds and Recommended Solutions, in PREsIDENT's
PANEL 157, 158-9; Randall, Possibilities of Achieving a Quiet Society, in
PREsENT's PANEL 143, 144-48. But see FAA, 1965 NATIONAL AIRPORT
PLAN 14-16.
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power to directly zone future airport areas,'1 2 one writer -has
suggested that such a power may be found within the commerce
clause." 3 In addition, some decisions suggest that federal zoning
power might be grounded in the war powers, the commerce
clause, or by analogy, the power over navigable rivers.1 4 Since
the national commercial jet fleet is ready for military service on
thirty-six hour notice as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet,"5 the war
powers argument may have merit.
By whatever governmental unit, effective zoning appears to
be an attractive solution to the noise problem because it can cre-
ate compatible land uses in airport vicinities." 6 However, it is
of little value to those residential areas which already have
severe noise afflictions," 7 since "zoning out" such established
residences amounts to a taking for which compensation must
be paid." 8
112. Randall, op. cit. supra note 111, at 143.
113. Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 103, at 134.
114. It seems to be firmly established that Congress may enact laws
and grant regulatory discretions repugnant to state or local zoning laws,
and that the latter must yield. The cases have involved federal con-
struction projects under the war power or power over navigable rivers.
Although the nation is not actually at war, federal activity can be
deemed preparation for war. See 1 YOELEY, ZONING LAw AND PRACTicE
§ 39 (2d ed. 1953), and cases cited therein.
115. Tondel, op. cit. supra note 97, at 118 n.6; 64 Stat. 798 (1950), 50
U.S.C. § 2062; 28 Fed. Reg. 2833-34 (1963).
116. Forest preserves, parks, artificial lakes, sewage disposal plants,
industries, agricultural uses, reforestatlon projects, commercial cen-
ters, and riding academies have been suggested as compatible land
uses. FAA, 1965 NATIONAL AIRPORT PLAN 15; LEAGUE OF MTINN. MuNIc-
IPALITIES, ZONING GUIDE FOR M.INN. CITIES AND VILLAGES 16-17 (1952);
Strunk, An Analysis of the Advantages & Difficulties of Zoning Regs.
for Chicago O'Hare International Airport, in PREsmENT's PANEL 151, 155-
56; WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING AND MuNIcIPAL POLIcY 388-89 (1958);
Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 103, at 136-37.
An additional possibility is to include stringent soundproofing re-
quirements in building codes. Time, Aug. 19, 1966, p. 25. A further
possibility is underground construction. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 14,
col. 6.
117. See Odell, op. cit. supra note 87, at 166. Perhaps future national
or state statutes could be drawn whereby anyone building noise-vulner-
able structures within a prescribed radius of national or international
airports would be absolutely liable to their owners for noise-caused
diminutions in property values. If inverse condemnation laws of the
states and nation do begin to emburden the air transport system, Con-
gress may have power under the commerce clause to impose such lia-
bility upon those builders who violate prescribed noise-buffer radii.
118. 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.35 (3d ed. 1963); Randall, op.
cit. supra note 111, at 149. 1 YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 114, § 150. How-
ever, amortization ordinances exist wherein the owner is ordered to
terminate his nonconforming use after a period as long as the remain-
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B. ALTERNATIVES WHERE ZONING IS NOT FEASIBLE
For airport areas already surrounded by incompatible land
uses, possible solutions, especially condemnation, promise to be
of great immediate expense." 9 The cost-benefit analysis clearly
justifies placing much of the cost burden of airport area noise
upon the federal government, particularly if recommendations
for the federal government to take direct or indirect control of
the final feature-land zoning-are adopted. If that time
comes, the federal government will be in a controlling position
insofar as responsibility for all aspects of the noise problem is
concerned.
One suggestion for alleviating the local incidence of the
cost burden would entail a congressional amendment to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act to make the United States solely liable for all
takings due to jet noise at public airports. Presumably, the
commerce and war powers would permit Congress to preempt
all state remedies. Although Congress has no power to declare
there is no taking in cases such as Griggs, it seemingly has the
power to determine who should be liable for the costs. 120 The
same result could be obtained indirectly through adequate sub-
sidies to local airport authorities.
Some alternative steps which would at least partially amelio-
rate the jet noise problem in present airport areas include such
measures as systematic purchase of residences by airport au-
thDrities in anticipation of future expansion of operations; 121
su bsidizing soundproofing for residences through direct payments
to afflicted residents, or by allowing tax deductions to those who
dc- so privately;122 or planting sound absorbing shrubbery to
ing economic life of the structure-perhaps twenty to fifty years. 14
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 354, 356, 364-65 (1966).
119. It is noteworthy that the power of condemnation is widely
used by the federal government in connection with military airports.
Randall, op. cit. supra note 111, at 145.
120. Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 103, at 140-42. For instance, the
Tucker Act already permits suits in federal courts against the United
States for constitutional claims up to $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2).
Congress could declare that actions for property diminutions due to jet
noise must be exclusively against the United States.
121. PREsiDENT's PAxm 7. One of the largest American airports has
systematically been purchasing residential land in those areas where
PNdb. is expected to be over 105, hoping to recoup costs by -resale for
compatible uses. One authority, however, sees the new generation of
jets as potentially creating astronomical costs because of the size of
noise-affected (100 PNdb.) areas. Odell, op. cit. supra note 87, at 166.
122. See Dygert, An, Economic Approach to Airport Noise, in PREsI-
DENT's PANm 107, 111; Richards, The Control of Aircraft Noise Perceived
at Ground Level--Technical Aspects, 68 RoYAL AERONAUTiCAL Soc'y 45
19671 1109
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
reduce some of the noise.123 Technological breakthroughs, al-
though not expected to materialize in time to solve the immense
problems presently developing, must still be pursued for what-
ever marginal or substantial results they may ultimately pro-
duce.
All such remedies considered, the best view seems to be
that compatible land usage zoning for future airport areas and
condemnation and repurchase for presently impacted areas is
the only remedy effective on a large scale.124
C. THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL REMEDY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY
OWNER
Absent a comprehensive land use program it would be un-
just to deny recovery to those homeowners who are severely
damaged by jet noise, but who do not live directly beneath flight
paths. This is especially true as long as public funds underwrite
the noise-created costs of their neighbors whose airspace was
penetrated, and of others who receive the market value of their
property under various condemnation programs designed to
solve the noise problem. In addition, a few state courts-poten-
tially all those with damaging provisions in their constitutions
plus some others-currently recognize the "logic and fairness'' 125
of permitting recovery without overflights. In addition to these
considerations, the policy underlying the Batten line of cases-
fear of the economic burden to governmental activities-is not
persuasive in determining the most appropriate legal theory.
An underlying policy judgment that the costs of inverse
condemnation recoveries are prohibitive, is unmindful of the
viable alternatives open to government. Failure of government
to take these less costly steps should not operate to deny the
more costly recovery at law. In light of the predictable nature
of the damages involved,126 a judicial assumption that recoveries
in inverse condemnation would be unlimited is inappropriate.
(1964); Robinson, Bowsher & Copeland, On Judging the Noise from Air-
craft in Flight, 13 AcuSTICA 324 (1963); Tyler, A New Look at the Air-
craft Noise Problem, SAE PAPER 911B, at 18 (Oct. 5-9, 1964).
123. Dygert, op. cit. supra note 122, at 111.
124. PRESIDENT'S PANEL 7; Strunk, Airport Zoning, 50 A.B.A.J. 345
(1964); Fleming, Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property Without
Just Compensation, 18 S.C.L. REV. 593, 596 (1966).
125. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 88;
see Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 198, 376 P.2d 100, 109
(1962); Fleming, supra note 124, at 606.
126. See notes 75-76 supra.
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Viewed alone, inverse condemnation proceedings entail
enormous costs. 1 27 However, less costly solutions, such as zoning
and condemnation, are available to the governmental units in-
volved. It has even been suggested that condemnation and re-
sale for compatible uses would result in long term profits.1 28
In addition, since the present status of technology permits a
clear delineation of the zones near an airport which will be
affected by flight procedures of given aircraft, 29 liability limits
can be known. Permitting such recoveries at law would not halt
air commerce, but would be likely to motivate corrective govern-
mental measures.
Having sounded in both overflight and nuisance, the Su-
preme Court is free 30 to formulate a legal theory granting re-
covery absent overflight, which will control the federal courts
and, through the fourteenth amendment, the states.13' It has
been predicted that the Court will merely adopt a clear con-
demnation-by-nuisance policy, without reasoning from prece-
dents. 32  Nevertheless, there are ample rationales upon which
the Court can adopt a condemnation-by-nuisance policy permit-
ting recovery without overflight. For instance, the penetration
requirement could be retained, but penetrations of energy could
be equated with penetrations by mass. In short, penetrations to
property, such as radioactivity, noise, vibrations, and electro-
magnetic waves, which even though unseen are capable of caus-
ing substantial losses in property value, could be deemed pene-
trations for purposes of recovery in inverse condemnation. 33
An alternative rationale is based upon the theory of special
damages found in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.1 3 4 Of
127. In 1962, 100,000 homeowners were in the Griggs (overflight)
class. Kryter & Pearsons, Judgement Tests of the Sound from Piston,
Turbojet, and Turbofan Aircraft, Sound, March-April 1962, p. 24.
128. Randall, op. cit. supra note 111, at 150.
129. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text; Randall, op. cit.
supra note 111, at 150.
130. Since Griggs and Causby both involved overflights, the issue of
a nuisance without overflights has never been presented to the Supreme
Court. One commentator expects a standard of condemnation by nui-
sance alone to be accepted by the Court, probably in a Batten-type case.
Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect
and Prospect, 71 DIcK. L. REV. 207, 224, 237-38 (1967).
131. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); see
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
132. Stoebuck, supra note 130, at 215-17, 224.
133. See 9 McG.L L.J. 246 (1963).
134. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914), dis-
cussed at note 42 supra.
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the persons living in an airport vicinity only those living directly
under designated flight paths and within the cone a few thou-
sand feet to each side of the flight paths are exposed to damaging
noise levels. Sinc& governmental authorities determine noise
contours for engines, license aircraft and engines, and fix
flight paths and maneuvers, they are consciously directing the
paths of the noise nuisance. Recovery could then be allowed on
the principle that the plaintiff's property was made the special
focus of a governmentally sponsored nuisance-that continuous
flights impose special harm upon his property, which is not gen-
erally shared by those within the airport vicinity.135 However,
the force of this argument would be lost if future airport design,
engine thrusts, air traffic density, and flight patterns combined
to form overlapping cones of damaging noise levels. In such a
case all property in an airport area would receive the damaging
noise levels.
Theoretically, an additional rationale, applicable in a few
cases, is that recovery for lost property value should be al-
lowed since the authorities could reasonably have forbidden
certain engines or flight paths, located an airport at a more
compatible site, prevented improper zoning, or condemned resi-
dences. Such a rationale is analogous to that of Baltimore &
P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church,3 6 under which recovery for prop-
erty losses was permitted when reasonable alternative sites for
the governmental activity existed.
V. CONCLUSION
The equities of permitting recovery for inverse condemnation,
regardless of overflights, to all who suffer substantial property
losses due to public airport noise have been widely praised. 37
These considerations should be outweighed only by clear evi-
dence that the costs of such recoveries would seriously impede
the national air commerce system and that there exists no
reasonable alternative location for the airport. Such a showing,
135. As a corollary to this, special damages rationale, it has been
implied that proof of intentionally inflicting such damages would sup-
port recovery for a taking. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585
(10th Cir. 1962). "Intentionally" was not defined by the Batten court.
136. 108 U.S. 317 (1883). For a description of this case, a nuisance
claim, see note 44 supra.
137. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 99 (Fla. 1964);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 198, 376 P.2d 100, 109 (1962);
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 317, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964);
Fleming, supra note 124, at 600; see Note, 47 mN. L. REv. 889 (1963).
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however, has not been made. The high immediate costs for
accommodating present airport areas can be recouped, and
through prompt national action the compounding of the problem
for future airports can be prevented. Although a trend toward
condemnation by nuisance exists in some state courts, the divi-
sion among the state courts and between some states and the
federal courts could prove to be a source of undesirable eco-
nomic consequences.12 8
It is apparent that the immediate costs of coping with noise-
vulnerable residential areas near established airports should be
borne in large part by the federal government. Federal funds
will not be available except through subsidies, however, as long
as Griggs is interpreted to hold that the proper defendant is the
local airport authority.
A strong federal hand in airport zoning control, whether
direct or indirect, is necessary to prevent future problems. The
alternatives to a larger federal role would include a reliance
upon diverse local zoning reforms to cope with future noise prob-
lems and a continuing restrictive federal judicial remedy, in
contrast to the present potentially mischievous schism in state
court remedies. On balance these alternatives seem undesirable.
133. If some states allow recovery without overflight while others
do not, airport defendants in the former will acquire an additional im-
mediate cost factor. This cost will be internalized and allocated to the
airlines in the form of higher fees (less whatever additional subsidies
can be obtained). See Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise,
30 J. Am L. & Com. 207, 216 (1964). Some commercial airlines have
threatened to abandon some air centers, thereby allegedly causing broad
economic shifts to competing areas which covet the other's commerce.
See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1966, p. 2 (threat to New York City
based upon air traffic difficulties). If higher fees could produce this
result, the judicial conflict as to the overflight requirement could have
undesirable effects upon national commerce.
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Appendix: The Sonic Boom Problem
The sonic boom is the byproduct of supersonic flight, caused
by increases in atmospheric pressure in the wake of an air-
craft. 13 9 Since commercial SST flights will not begin until 1971-
1974,140 current instances of sonic boom damages relate to mili-
tary or experimental aircraft.' 4 '
The sparse sonic boom case law is unfavorable to the in-
jured party. The Federal Tort Claims Act does not create ab-
solute liability for sonic boom damages on the part of the United
States, 42 and since res ipsa loquitur is not available, plaintiffs
must prove pilot negligence-a considerable burden. 43  More-
over, it has recently been held that the Federal Tort Claims Act's
exception for "discretionary duty" applies to the creation of sonic
booms by United States pilots, thus blocking recoveries for
sonic boom damages on the basis of sovereign immunity.
144
Public demand for a more effective legal remedy for sonic
boom damages may be rather small if some FAA-NASA tests
are valid. As few complaints as .1 per cent per capita were
139. See Clark, Buhr & Nexsen, Studies of Sonic-Boom Induced
Damage, NASA CONTRACTOR REPORTS 227, at II-1 & 2 (May 1965) [here-
inafter cited as NASA CR]; McLean, Carlson & Hutton, Sonic-Boom
Characteristics of Proposed SST and HST Airplanes, NASA TECHICAL
NoTrs D-3587, at 1-2 (Sept. 1966) [hereinafter cited as NASA TN].
For an excellent overlay photo, see Newsweek, July 27, 1964, p. 52.
140. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept. 12, 1966, pp. 89, 95.
141. See Brown v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 774 (D. Mass. 1964);
Coxsey v. Hallaby, 231 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (injunction
against experimental series of booms denied because FAA was author-
ized to conduct such experiments). For Federal Tort Claims Act cases,
see note 144 infra.
142. Brown v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D. Mass. 1964).
Probably because of the occasional nature of the sonic booms, no inverse
condemnation suits on a theory of taking through continuing nuisance
have been found. Whether after commercial SST operations commence
such a remedy should be allowed depends upon policy and cost consid-
erations, discussed at notes 84, 102 & 105 supra and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 776. An independent architectural firm was employed
by NASA to study sonic boom damages in St. Louis during a test boom
series. Most damages were attributable to poor construction (building
code called for 20 lbs. per sq. ft. minimum resistance, and sonic booms
under 3 lbs. per sq. ft. cracked plaster or titles), deterioration due to
age, or faulty installation of glass or plaster. Sound constructions were
not damaged, and properly installed glass did not crack nor deflect any
farther than under shocks from passing highway traffic. Clark, Buhr &
Nexsen, supra note 139, at I-1, V-1, IV-2 & 3.
144. Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965); Hus-
lander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964); cf. Coxsey
v. Hallaby, 231 F. Supp. 978 (D. Okla. 1964). But see Brown v. United
States, 230 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D. Mass. 1964) (dictum); cf. Western v.
McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962).
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registered during an extensive St. Louis experiment.1 45 Factors
which contributed to this surprisingly high tolerance level were
probably: (1) There were only 0.83 damages per flight per one
million persons exposed to the sonic booms, and on the average
these damages were small; 146 (2) The sonic boom noise level is
usually below the limit found to be psychologically acceptable for
takeoffs and landings;147 (3) The audible indoor sound pressure
increases (dbs.) are relatively low compared with inaudible
increases; 148 (4) About 90 per cent of the complaints were con-
fined to the area lying twelve miles to the sides of the flight
track;149 (5) Almost no personal injuries resulted from the
booms.10
In strong contrast to the general airport area noise dilemma,
there are reportedly prospects for a substantial technological
solution to the sonic boom problem. 15' If the boom can be
eliminated or significantly reduced below present maximum
assigned tolerances'152 prior to the advent of commercial SST
145. Clark, Buhr & Nexsen, supra note 139, at IV-3; Nixon & Hub-
bard, Results of USAF-NASA-FAA Flight Program To Study Commu-
nity Responses to Sonic Booms in the Greater St. Louis Area, NASA TN
D-2705, at 20-21 (May 1965).
146. Nixon & Hubbard, supra note 145, at 21.
147. Pearsons & Kryter, Laboratory Tests of Subjective Reactions to
Sonic Boom, NASA CR 187, at 20-21 (March 1965) (2.3 lbs. per ft.
overpressure, .3 lb. above maximums set by FAA, create 95.5 PNdb.,
which is within the tolerance for jet noise in residential areas).
148. Hilton, Huckel, Steiner & Maglieri, Sonic-Boom Exposures Dur-
ing FAA Community-Response Studies Over a 6-Month Period in the
Okla. City Area, NASA TN D-2539, at 1, 11-12 (Dec. 1964).
149. Clark, Buhr & Nexsen, supra note 139, at V-i; see Maglieri,
Hilton and McLeod, Experiments on the Effects of Atmospheric Re-
fraction & Airplane Accelerations on Sonic-Boom Ground Pressure
Patterns, NASA TN D-3520, at 13, 23 (July 1966).
150. Hilton, Huckel & Maglieri, Sonic Boom Measurements During
Bomber Training Operations in the Chicago Area, NASA TN D-3655, at
15 (Oct. 1966); Nixon & Hubbard, supra note 145, at 21.
151. One aeronautical authority believes a design breakthrough
would eliminate the boom altogether during cruise speeds, and would
cut it from the FAA-designated 2 lbs per sq. ft. overpressure during
climb to 1 lb. per sq. ft. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Aug. 3,
1964, p. 39. Another research report indicates that substantial modifi-
cations in the boom during climb are possible, but argues that cruise
reductions will be less substantial, given presently known principles.
McLean, Carlson & Hutton, supra note 139, at 8-9 (Sept. 1966). If cer-
tain design techniques for area distributions of aircraft surfaces can be
achieved, sonic booms much lower than those presently produced would
be possible. McLean, Some Nonasymptotic Effects on the Sonic Boom
of Large Airplanes, NASA TN D-2877, at 18 (June 1965).
152. Although tests have been conducted with 2.3 to 3 lbs. per sq.
ft. overpressures at ground level, the design plans and assigned over-
pressure limits are 2.0 during climb and 1.5 to 1.7 during cruise. Avia-
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flights, 153 no general legal remedy need be created.
Assuming, however, that no technological deus ex machina
materializes in time to prevent the problem, there are several
solutions which offer varying degrees of hope. First, and most
drastic, would be to prohibit supersonic speeds over populated
land masses, thus curtailing part of the economic motive for SST
development, 54 although the vital trans-Atlantic trade would
still remain. 5 5 Less dramatic would be a prohibition of super-
sonic speeds at altitudes below forty-three to fifty thousand feet,
which theoretically would allow the intervening airspace to dissi-
pate most of the boom.156  This, unfortunately, would necessi-
tate slower, costlier climbs from takeoff 57 and could result in an
increase in the area exposed to conventional jet noise. 58
A somewhat more fatalistic approach would be to accept the
FAA's present sonic boom limitations, within which SST's alleg-
edly can operate and endure the results. 59 However, military
SST research indicates that the boom created by craft designed
to operate within the designated levels can vary widely, both
above and below the maximums, due to atmospheric conditions
which can change enough in two hours to drive the boom level
from a high to a low extreme. 160
Creation of a more effective legal remedy should therefore
await determinations concerning the achievement of an engineer-
ing breakthrough or the ability to utilize flight techniques
which would confine the boom within psychologically tolerable
limits. However, the considerations of policy which should ma-
terially affect the creation of a legal remedy seem clear. If the
national interest in acquiring a cross-continental SST fleet can-
tion Week & Space Technology, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 39; Clark, Buhr &
Nexsen, supra note 151, at IV-1 & 3; McLean, Carlson & Hutton, supra
note 143, at 2-3; Pearsons & Kryter, supra note 147, at 20-21.
153. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept. 19, 1966, pp. 89, 95.
154. See note 84 supra concerning commercial motives for SST
development program.
155. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Aug. 3, 1964, pp. 38-40.
Trans-Atlantic commercial aviation will total 15% of all noncommunist
bloc aviation by the early 1970's. It is in this market that the Anglo-
French Concorde and the American SST will mostly compete.
156. See Aviation Week & Space Technology, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 41;
Newsweek, July 27, 1964, p. 52.
157. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Aug. 3, 1964, pp. 38-40.
158. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 152 supra.
160. Hilton, Huckel & Maglieri, supra note 150, at 8-9; See Hilton,
Huckel, Steiner & Maglieri, supra note 148, at 9; McLean, Carlson and
Hutton, supra note 151, at 3.
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not be sacrificed to the interests of a more quiet society, cost
balancing not unlike that underlying the general airport noise
problem seems in order. Thus, if studies showing that the cost
of boom damages is relatively small prove valid, 6 ' a system for
administrative claim adjustments would be feasible. Con-
versely, if the economic burden of sonic boom damages would
substantially impede the SST fleet program,162 recoveries should
be limited to tolerable amounts. The shield of sovereign im-
munity could be extended to air carriers, or recovery could be
awarded only upon a showing of actual negligence in the crea-
tion of the allegedly injurious sonic boom.
161. If the average over a long, all-weather test is .83 damages per
flight per million population at an average cost of $71 each, and if
nearly all damages are limited to the 40-mile carpet beneath the flight,
an SST flight passing near 10 million persons would result in about
$590 in damages. See Nison & Hubbard, supra note 145, at 21. Since
a single circling of an airport by a SST due to landing delays can cost up
to $20,000 in fuel, the cost of creating a system to adjust all damage
claims which are shown to be due to the flight's sonic boom may not be
prohibitive. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 40.
162. In the Chicago study 49 sonic overflights-all beneath the rec-
ommended altitudes for boom minimization-were made. During the
test period of two months, 7,116 complaints were received; 2,964 formal
claims for damages were filed; 1,442 claims were approved with the
caveat that such approval did not mean validation of the claim. Only
one claim for a personal injury was filed and it was not approved. The
total cost was $114,763. If this high figure was due to normal boom
damages, the cost of systematic compensation may prove too great. If
part of it is attributable to lower altitudes of the boom producing air-
craft, or generous public relations by the Air Force, the St. Louis re-
sults are not rebutted, and costs may not be too burdensome. See Hil-
ton, Huckel & Maglieri, supra note 150, at 3-4, 15.
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